Electoral fraud: who watches the counters?
ELECTORAL FRAUD 10: IT readjustments, or when the numbers don’t add up and are readjusted electronically.
Once the votes are counted, all that information is sent electronically to data centers that... who manages them? With what guarantees? What happens when the data doesn’t match, etc.? Unfortunately, this fraud is far from being exposed, since unless someone from the inside speaks out, it is a serious state matter that, if true, would have serious consequences, but as of today it is only a possibility. Obviously, electoral rules are made to fight against these possibilities, and here there is clearly a loss of control by the citizens, since from the moment the data leaves the polling station until it is made public, it can be tampered with. In fact, as you can see in our database, it has been reported in the past and manual recounts have been demanded by opening the envelopes in the courts, which, by the way, are usually ignored and only the electronic data is used without cross-checking with the final envelopes, something that, obviously, can lead to fraud.
ELECTORAL FRAUD 10.2: ASSIGNING VOTES FROM PARTY A TO PARTY B AT THE POLLING STATIONS
2016-08-27 The Xunta awards services related to the Galician elections to a company founded by former senior PP officials
This company, according to Galicia Confidencial, has as its sole administrator Netaccede, another company founded 16 years ago with the participation of senior officials of the regional government during Manuel Fraga’s era. This media outlet mentions, among others, Diego Ramón Diz Fernández (former director of the Galician Institute of Economic Promotion) and José María Matas (former general director of Informatics of the Xunta).
2016-06-27 Is it possible to falsify the data? Is electoral fraud possible?
"How the final count data is handled in the contracting company depends on very few people; therefore, from that point of view it is more than possible to alter the result. But the results from the polling stations are public and should be accessible in all polling stations after voting, so in theory it should be very easy to cross-check them with those provided by the Ministry of the Interior."
"After all, the main person responsible for the provisional count, whether or not there is electoral fraud, is the same one we heard a week ago conspiring against political rivals in the recordings made available to everyone by the newspaper Público. If this is not enough reason to suspect, a new meaning of faith will have to be found."
http://iniciativadebate.org/2016/06/27/es-factible-un-pucherazo-en-espana/
2016-06-30 Scytl considers challenging the 26-J tender after learning of Indra’s price reduction
As El Confidencial revealed on May 13, Indra won this contract by committing to count the votes of the 36.55 million Spaniards eligible to vote for 3.9 million euros. A price significantly lower than the 10.9 million offered by the company 22% owned by the State for the previous elections, which lost to Scytl and Tecnocom, who won with a proposal of 9.8 million. Additionally, the new proposal is far from the 14.3 million offered in the 2011 elections.
2015-06-11 The mystery of the 20,000 missing votes in Jaén
Now the Andalusian Electoral Board, in an official correction known on June 5, six days ago, officially acknowledges a difference of 20,000 votes in the province of Jaén, about which no investigation has been conducted regarding their origin or destination nor has the D'Hondt method been applied to the new results to check if there was any modification of the official results. A new difference of more than 3,000 votes also appears in the province of Seville. - Continue reading: http://www.libertaddigital.com/espana/2015-06-11/susana-diaz-sera-investida-sin-saberse-como-se-asignaron-20000-votos-1276550319/